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COMMENTS
Revitalizing the Law That "Preceded the
Movement": Associational Discrimination
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Bianca G. Chamuscot
INTRODUCTION
Give me a place to stand on, and I can move the earth.
-Archimedes'
A deaf man is admitted to the hospital for emergency surgery.
The hospital, unable to locate an available American Sign Language
interpreter, relies on the man's children to communicate with
him. As the man's health declines, the children become increas-
ingly overwhelmed by their task. Forced to miss school in order to
translate unfamiliar medical terminology for their dying father,
the children later sue the hospital on their own behalf; they allege
that the hospital has discriminated against them based on their as-
sociation with a disabled person in violation of both the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 19902 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.3 Do they have a case?4
To be sure, this is not the prototypical lawsuit under either
Act. In the normal course of events, the father, a disabled individ-
ual, will have standing to sue on his own behalf.5 But in a quirk
t BA 2013, The University of Chicago; MA 2014, The University of Chicago; JD
Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Archimedes, The Works of Archimedes xix (Cambridge 1897) (T.L. Heath, ed). It is
highly unlikely, of course, that Archimedes had legal standing in mind when he wrote
these famous words.
2 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
3 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq.
4 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Loeffler v Staten Island University
Hospital, 582 F3d 268, 271-74 (2d Cir 2009), discussed in Part II.B.
5 See 29 USC § 794a(a)(2); 42 USC § 12188.
1285
The University of Chicago Law Review
of both statutes, nondisabled plaintiffs may also sue-not to vin-
dicate their father's rightse but to litigate their own. This some-
what neglected provision, known as "associational standing,"7 has
resulted in substantial judicial confusion both at the district-
court levels and in the circuit courts of appeals,9 especially in the
Rehabilitation Act context.
This Comment seeks to resolve the confusion by defining the
scope of standing under the Rehabilitation Act. It does so, first,
by engaging with the Rehabilitation Act's statutory language and
recent Supreme Court precedent interpreting that same language
as it arises in different statutory contexts. Second, this Comment
considers standing under the Rehabilitation Act with an eye to-
ward that Act's uneasy entanglement with the ADA. Even though
Congress intended the ADA to bolster the Rehabilitation Act's ef-
ficacy as a safeguard for disability rights,10 scholars have noted
that the incentives for bringing suit under the ADA are too weak
on their own to lead to adequate enforcement.,' Because the
Rehabilitation Act authorizes remedies that are unavailable un-
der the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act appears to be uniquely poised
to effectuate the antidiscrimination aims of both statutes.
This Comment is organized as follows: Part I summarizes the
history of disability antidiscrimination statutes in federal court
from the end of World War I to the present and outlines the areas
in which the modern statutes overlap. Part II delves into the
Supreme Court's competing standing doctrines and considers
6 While courts generally bar litigants from suing to enforce the legal rights of others,
there are limited exceptions. See generally Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third-Party
Standing, 24 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 277 (2015). See also Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 750-
56 (1984). While third-party standing is important to the law of standing generally, it is
not relevant to associational standing because associational plaintiffs seek to vindicate
their own rights in court-not the rights of others.
7 Note that "associational standing" in this context means standing to sue for dis-
criminatory acts toward a person as a result of that person's association with a disabled
individual. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "associational" does not reach en-
tities or organizations. For an explanation of this other type of associational standing as
it relates to advocacy organizations, see generally Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Comment,
The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations' Associational Standing to
Sue, 157 U Pa L Rev 237 (2008).
8 See, for example, Collins v Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, 2015 WL 268842,
*8 (D NH). See also Part II.C.
9 Compare, for example, Loeffler, 582 F3d at 279, with McCullum v Orlando Regional
Health-Care System, Inc, 768 F3d 1135, 1143 (11th Cir 2014). See also Part II.
10 See Part I.C.
11 See, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disa-
bility Rights Movement 124-28 (Yale 2009); Ruth Colker, The Disability Pendulum: The
First Decade of the Americans with Disabilities Act 183 (NYU 2005).
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the recent circuit split on the associational standing issue in the
Rehabilitation Act context. In the process, it surveys the argu-
ments for both a broad and a narrow interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act's scope. Part III contemplates a solution born
of statutory interpretation and economic analysis. Part III.A ob-
serves the necessity, in light of two recent Supreme Court opin-
ions authored by Justice Antonin Scalia,12 of formally importing
the zone-of-interests test into disability law. Finally, Part III.B
argues that this zone of interests, once the test is adopted, should
be wide. Interpreting the Rehabilitation Act's standing provision
broadly not only better accords with the Act's statutory language,
but it would also aid in deterring discriminatory conduct toward
disabled individuals and their associates, potentially leading to
expanded protections for the largest minority group13 in the
United States.
I. DISABILITIES IN FEDERAL COURT: A HISTORY
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against
otherwise-qualified individuals with disabilities by programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance.14 It was a landmark piece of
legislation when it was finally ratified in 1973, but its passage
into law was by no means assured. Despite the bill's strong sup-
port in the Senate, President Richard Nixon twice vetoed it," and
regulations enforcing the Act were not issued until 1977-a full
four years after the Act had been passed and only after much leg-
islative "foot-dragging" had ensued.16 It is thus not a stretch to,
like Professor Ruth O'Brien, call its presence on the books "an
accident of history"17-a historic victory for the disability rights
movement even if it proved less effective at combating discrimi-
nation than originally hoped.18
12 See generally Thompson v North American Stainless, LP, 562 US 170 (2011);
Lexmark International, Inc v Static Control Components, Inc, 134 S Ct 1377 (2014).
13 See Mark C. Weber, Understanding Disability Law v (LexisNexis 2007).
14 See Rehabilitation Act § 504, 87 Stat at 394, 29 USC § 794(a).
15 Ruth O'Brien, Crippled Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the
Workplace 121-22 (Chicago 2001).
16 Id at 126-28.
17 Id at 5.
18 See Susan Gluck Mezey, Disabling Interpretations: The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act in Federal Court 24 (Pittsburgh 2005) (noting that, by the late 1980s, disability
rights advocates had become convinced that § 504 was "inadequate to achieve their goal
of removing barriers to . . . full participation in society" because "there was never a real
commitment to enforce it").
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The Rehabilitation Act was not Congress's first attempt to
secure rights for individuals with disabilities, and it is only one of
several federal disability discrimination statutes in force today.19
While this Comment focuses primarily on the Rehabilitation Act
and its role in ensuring access to federally funded programs and
activities (particularly in the healthcare arena and with the goal
of offsetting some of the ADA's statutory defects),20 the Act cannot
be understood in isolation from its counterparts or without refer-
ence to the political environment at the time of its birth. Accord-
ingly, this Part considers the Rehabilitation Act's origins in light of
a shift in public perception from hostility toward or pity for indi-
viduals with disabilities to a push for substantive legal protections.
Framing the rise of disability rights litigation in conjunction with
the demands of African Americans and women for equal protection
under the Constitution2l is critical for understanding how the
Rehabilitation Act was drafted and has since been adjudicated.22
A. From Pathology to Civil Rights
The Rehabilitation Act has its roots in the post-World War I
Vocational Rehabilitation Act,23 which provided for "vocational re-
habilitation and return to civil employment" for disabled veter-
ans. 2 4 Congress followed up the 1918 law with the Smith-Fess
19 While the most significant are the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA of 1990,
others include the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (ABA), Pub L 90-480, 82 Stat 718,
codified at 42 USC § 4151 et seq, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of
1975 (IDEA), Pub L No 101-476, 104 Stat 1103, codified at 20 USC § 1400 et seq. Federal
programs may be subject to overlapping statutory provisions of two or more of these laws.
See Laura Rothstein, Disability Discrimination Statutes or Tort Law: Which Provides the
Best Means to Ensure an Accessible Environment?, 75 Ohio St L J 1263, 1271 (2014).
20 For a discussion of the ADA's enforcement challenges stemming from its remedial
scheme, see Part III.C. This Comment does not address employment discrimination under
the Rehabilitation Act. For a comprehensive analysis of workplace discrimination under
the various disability discrimination laws, see generally O'Brien, Crippled Justice (cited
in note 15).
21 The political advocacy of these groups gave rise to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq, and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified at 52 USC § 10101 et
seq, among other pieces of legislation.
22 See Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 9 (cited in note 18).
23 40 Stat 617 (1918).
24 40 Stat at 617. These programs offered rehabilitation, job training, and job place-
ment resources for individuals "who, in the general consciousness, would be a burden on
many employers." Thomas B. Heywood, Note, State-Funded Discrimination: Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act and Its Uneven Application to Independent Contractors and Other
Workers, 60 Cath U L Rev 1143, 1150 (2011).
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Act25 in 1920, which extended vocational rehabilitation to civil-
ians with physical disabilities and sought to "offer[ ] limited ser-
vices for the physically handicapped."26 As admirable as these
early efforts were, they were examples of what historians have
called the "medical model" or "social pathology model" of disabil-
ity,27 models both premised on the belief that it was the disabled
person-not society or one's physical environment-who must
change.28
It was not until the 1966 publication of a now-famous law
review article that the turning tide of the disability rights move-
ment became clear.29 Professors Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W.
Matson described a movement away from "custodialism" and to-
ward "integrationism," which they saw as part of a larger recon-
ceptualization of the meaning of equality in American society.30
Whereas before the disabled were seen as the "other, [individuals]
to be cured, or if they could not be cured, to be isolated"31 and in-
stitutionalized, efforts by African Americans and women to secure
civil rights guarantees under the Constitution inspired disability
rights activists to seek similar protections for themselves.32 These
efforts ushered in a new, rights-based approach to antidiscrimina-
tion advocacy that marked "a shift from charity to civil rights."33
25 41 Stat 735 (1920), repealed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-112,
87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq.
26 HR Rep No 93-244, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1973). See also Chai R. Feldblum, Defi-
nition of Disability under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And
What Can We Do about It?, 21 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 91, 95-96 (2000).
27 See, for example, John Gliedman and William Roth, The Unexpected Minority:
Handicapped Children in America 27 (Harcourt 1980); Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Phys-
ical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J Soc Issues 39, 39 (1988).
28 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities,
40 UCLA L Rev 1341, 1347-48 (1993).
29 See generally Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law
of Welfare, 54 Cal L Rev 809 (1966).
30 See id at 833-40.
31 Weber, Understanding Disability Law at 1 (cited in note 13) (discussing the pub-
lication of the tenBroek and Matson article and the shift in public perception that
prompted it).
32 See tenBroek and Matson, 54 Cal L Rev at 833 (cited in note 29); Mezey, Disabling
Interpretations at 9 (cited in note 18); Feldblum, 21 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 97 (cited
in note 26).
33 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Imp lica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv CR-CL L Rev 413, 426 (1991)
(detailing the shift in society's conception of its obligations to the disabled community).
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Real change for disabled individuals, however, would not
come easily. Congress had two avenues at its disposal for address-
ing disability discrimination: it could either attempt to introduce
new legislation that addressed only disability discrimination is-
sues, or it could amend the race-based civil rights statutes already
in existence to additionally prohibit discrimination on the basis of
disability.34 Both strategies presented significant drawbacks. The
creation of new, freestanding legislation for disability rights
would be time-consuming and could backfire if people interpreted
those efforts as a signal that disabled individuals were somehow
unworthy of protection under the existing antidiscrimination
laws. But amending existing laws would also be difficult, as pro-
visions drafted to address race discrimination might not work
well in the disability context.35 For one thing, a person's disability
status may be relevant to assessing one's capabilities in situa-
tions in which one's race or gender do not matter. 36
Ultimately, Congress opted to try both strategies. In the
1970s, Senators Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn) and Charles Percy
(R-Ill) and Representative Charles Vanik (D-Ohio) proposed
amending Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 which prohib-
ited discrimination only on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex,
[and] national origin,"8 to include disability as a protected cate-
gory.39 Opposition to extending civil rights protections to include
disabled people was so strong, however, that efforts to include
them alongside the other protected classes failed.40 Some politi-
cians were wary of "diluting" the hard-won civil rights that had so
recently been enshrined into law, and they expressed anxiety at
the prospect of bringing the Civil Rights Act back onto the Senate
floor lest political maneuvering gut the legislation.41 The Justice
Department thus suggested to Humphrey that the language from
34 Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 10 (cited in note 11).
35 See id at 10-11.
36 If, for example, a warehouse position requires the ability to lift at least fifty
pounds, the warehouse supervisor may legitimately refuse to hire an individual who can-
not meet that requirement even if the reason she cannot meet it is a disability.
37 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
38 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-716, 78 Stat at 253-66.
39 See Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 11 (cited in note 11).
40 See O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 132-33 (cited in note 15).
41 See Lennard J. Davis, Enabling Acts: The Hidden Story of How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Gave the Largest US Minority Its Rights 10 (Beacon 2015).
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the failed attempt to amend the Civil Rights Act be added instead
to the planned 1972 update of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.42
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act's enumerated purposes included
Congress's desire to "provid[e] vocational rehabilitation services
... for the benefit of [handicapped] individuals" and to "initiate
and expand services to groups of handicapped individuals ...
who have been underserved in the past."43 Three sections of the
Rehabilitation Act are particularly relevant to effectuating those
ends. Section 501 pertains only to employment and establishes a
federal Interagency Committee whose role is to oversee compli-
ance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individ-
uals with disabilities in the federal government.44 Section 501 ad-
ditionally requires federal agencies to implement affirmative ac-
tion plans for the hiring, placement, and advancement of such
individuals.4 Later legislation provides for a private right of ac-
tion against any federal employer who fails to do so.46 Section 503
mandates that every contract with the United States for an
amount totaling $10,000 or more include a provision requiring af-
firmative action to employ qualified individuals with disabili-
ties.47 Courts have unanimously concluded that § 503, unlike
§ 501, neither confers a private right of action nor imposes a duty
on contractors to hire disabled individuals.48
The most famous and impactful provision of the Rehabilitation
Act, however, is and has been § 504.49 Interestingly, this section,
42 See O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 133 (cited in note 15). The original 1920 Vocational
Rehabilitation Act was due for a reworking, as disabled soldiers were beginning to return
from the Vietnam War. See Davis, Enabling Acts at 10 (cited in note 41).
43 Rehabilitation Act § 2, 87 Stat at 357.
44 See Rehabilitation Act § 501(a), 87 Stat at 390, 29 USC § 791(a).
45 See Rehabilitation Act § 501(b), 87 Stat at 390, 29 USC § 791(b).
46 Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub L No 95-602, 92 Stat 2955, codified in various sections of Title 29.
See also 29 USC § 794a(a)(1).
47 29 USC § 793(a). At the time of enactment, the contract amount was $2,500. See
Rehabilitation Act § 503, 87 Stat at 393.
48 Section 503 simply requires federal agencies to make and enforce contracts con-
taining the affirmative action language. See, for example, Clemmer v Enron Corp, 882
F Supp 606, 611 (SD Tex 1995).
49 See Sharon Barnartt and Richard Scotch, Disability Protests: Contentious Politics
1970-1999 166 (Gallaudet 2001).
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which contains the Rehabilitation Act's most important and en-
during language, was born with little fanfare. Most of Congress's
attention during the committee hearings on the Act was focused
on budgetary concerns,50 not the forty-one words of § 504 that
would go on to form the backbones' of the ADA: "No otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance."2 Congress was so focused on those other concerns, in fact,
that virtually no discussion of § 504 occurred in the committee
hearings. The provision was not part of the first House resolution
for the bill:53 legislative aides working for Senators Alan Cranston
(D-Cal) and Harrison Williams (D-NJ) had inserted the section at
the last stage of the policymaking process5 4 as a nod to Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act's sweeping antidiscrimination language. The
Senate version, which did include the nondiscrimination lan-
guage, was accepted in conference with only the notation "[t]he
House recedes" and no further discussion.55
The legislature's silence on § 504 was an immediate source of
uncertainty for courts attempting to apply the new law,56 and the
confusion surrounding the drafters' intent persists today. Professor
Ruth O'Brien has identified § 504 as an "unanticipated conse-
quence"57 of the drafting process. Professor Robert Burgdorf Jr
has described its creation as "shrouded in [ ] mystery."5s And dis-
ability rights activist Marca Bristo has characterized it as an
"anomaly of history" and a "law [that] preceded the movement."59
50 See Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 12 (cited in note 11).
51 See 42 USC § 12132.
52 Rehabilitation Act § 504, 87 Stat at 394, 29 USC § 794. While § 504 did not initially
provide that private individuals may sue to enforce the statute, the section was amended
in 1978 to incorporate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which does provide for such a right.
Amendments of 1978 § 120, 92 Stat at 2982, 29 USC § 794a.
53 See Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 12 (cited in note 11).
54 See O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 107 (cited in note 15).
55 See Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 12 (cited in note 11).
56 See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr, "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Dis-
crimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 Vill L Rev 409, 421 (1997) (describing § 504 as "a disaster from a drafting
standpoint").
57 O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 5 (cited in note 15).
58 Burgdorf, 42 Vill L Rev at 419 (cited in note 56).
59 See Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 13 (cited in note 18). Congress's silence on
the intent behind § 504 continues to have consequences for courts attempting to define its
proper scope. See Part II.
1292 [84:1285
2017] Revitalizing the Law That "Preceded the Movement" 1293
Nevertheless, after a period of wrangling over the budgetary as-
pects of the bill and two vetoes, President Nixon finally signed the
Rehabilitation Act into law on September 26, 1973.60
The Act as implemented, however, provided far less protec-
tion than disability rights advocates had originally hoped for and
anticipated.61 The first major challenge facing the movement was
that the resulting regulations promulgated by the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) were self-
enforcing;2 Congress had not committed enforcement authority
to an executive branch agency like the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission.63 This meant that private litigation became
the primary means of implementing § 504,64 with responsibility
for interpreting those mysterious forty-one words falling to the
federal courts.65 While this might not ordinarily have posed a
problem for the movement, the courts at that time "could not be
described as strong proponents of promoting disability rights,
particularly in the workplace."66 And there was an additional, pro-
cedural reason for the advocacy community to be worried. Relying
on private lawsuits to effectuate the ends of § 504 was signifi-
cantly more cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive than
an administrative enforcement regime would have been.67
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's holdings in the decade
following the Rehabilitation Act's enactment validated those con-
cerns and further constrained the antidiscrimination effort.68 A
line of cases beginning with Southeastern Community College v
Davis6e "dealt a severe blow" to disability rights activists "for
whom section 504 was a central part of their policy aspirations."70
60 See O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 123 (cited in note 15). Nixon held a signing cere-
mony in order to "counter the assertions of those who claim[ed] that [his] vetoes" of the
two prior versions of the bill meant that his administration was "rejecting the handi-
capped." Id at 123 n 89.
61 See Drimmer, Comment, 40 UCLA L Rev at 1387 (cited in note 28); Timothy M.
Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temple L Rev 393,
394 (1991).
62 See O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 128 (cited in note 15).
63 Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 15 (cited in note 18).
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 O'Brien, Crippled Justice at 109 (cited in note 15).
67 See id at 130.
68 See Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 18 (cited in note 18).
69 442 US 397 (1979).
70 Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 19 (cited in note 18). At issue in Davis was
whether an applicant to an educational program must be evaluated on her qualifications
without regard to her disability and whether the Rehabilitation Act required the school to
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The decade that followed was a "generally conservative and re-
strictive" period for disability rights litigation, as the Court
proved suspicious of, and even downright hostile to, claims aris-
ing under the newly enacted antidiscrimination statutes (includ-
ing but not limited to § 504).71 Although the trend toward a nar-
row reading of the Rehabilitation Act's provisions later reversed
itself,72 the disability rights community was already looking
ahead to the possibility of a more robust and generous successor
statute that would cover more than just recipients of federal
funds.73
Despite the Rehabilitation Act's difficult birth and the hostil-
ity surrounding early attempts at enforcement, it is not quite ac-
curate to call the Act a failure. While its overall impact has been
comparatively modest thanks to its application only to programs
receiving federal funds, its symbolic importance has been great. 74
It was nevertheless clear in the first decade after enactment that
more action was needed in order to bring private enterprise
within the purview of federal disability law. To that end, and as
a "culmination of the increased awareness of the rights of people
with disabilities," in 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed
the ADA into law.75
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA is a comprehensive civil rights bill modeled after
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It incorporates large sections of the
text of the Rehabilitation Act. In fact, the ADA specifically pro-
vides that it should be read in conjunction with the Rehabilitation
accommodate her disability without regard to cost. The Court held that the school was not
required to accommodate a disability if it would work a "fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program," as the Rehabilitation Act was not intended to create "undue finan-
cial and administrative burdens." Davis, 442 US at 410, 412.
71 Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 18 (cited in note 18). In Board of Education of
the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v Rowley, 458 US 176 (1982), for example,
the Court reversed both courts below to find that Congress had only intended disabled
children to "benefit" from the educational services provided under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, not to reach their "maxim[um] ... potential 'commen-
surate with the opportunity provided [nonhandicapped] children."' Id at 198. Although
there were a few exceptions, the Supreme Court jurisprudence of this era, for the most
part, narrowed the parameters of disability rights legislation whenever possible.
72 Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 22 (cited in note 18).
73 Id at 24.
74 Barnartt and Scotch, Disability Protests at 167 (cited in note 49).
75 See Drimmer, Comment, 40 UCLA L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 28).
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Act76 in order to "assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for disabled in-
dividuals.77 Congress's motivation for passing additional protective
legislation was the recognition that even with the Rehabilitation
Act in place, disabled individuals often lacked legal recourse to
redress the discrimination they faced. As the Rehabilitation Act's
nondiscrimination requirements are tied to the receipt of federal
funds, there was a great risk of unequal treatment when it was
the only comprehensive federal disability statute in existence. In
the absence of state laws prohibiting discrimination against disa-
bled individuals, two programs that were exactly alike except for
their sources of funding could be treated differently under state
and federal law. Furthermore, programs that received no federal
funding were able to escape the purview of the Rehabilitation Act
entirely.78 Based on the belief that § 504 and its regulations were
"neither comprehensive nor well-enforced," disability rights activ-
ists advocated for a broader law.79 The ADA was the result.
The ADA comprises five titles. Title I governs employment
and applies to private employers, state and local governments,
labor unions, and employment agencies.80 It prohibits "discrimi-
nation against a qualified individual on the basis of disability" in
hiring, firing, and promotion decisions, as well as "other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."81 -
Title II builds on the Rehabilitation Act's prohibition of dis-
crimination in the administration of federally funded programs
and extends it to "public entities"-all programs operated by state
and local government agencies, including those that do not receive
federal money. 82 Using language modeled after § 504, Title II pro-
vides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be de-
nied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
76 See ADA § 501, 104 Stat at 369, 42 USC § 12201(a) ("[N]othing [in the ADA] shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under [the Rehabilitation
Act].").
77 ADA § 2, 104 Stat at 329, 42 USC § 12101(a)(7).
78 See Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 72 (cited in note 18).
79 Id.
80 See ADA § 101, 104 Stat at 330, 42 USC § 12111 et seq. The employment title is
not within the scope of this Comment. See note 20.
81 ADA § 2, 104 Stat at 238, 42 USC § 12112(a).
82 See ADA § 201, 104 Stat at 337, 42 USC § 12131 et seq.
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entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."83 Al-
though Title II contains no express associational discrimination
provision, a number of courts have read one in.84
Title III covers twelve enumerated categories of privately
funded programs including places of lodging, recreation, sales, ed-
ucation, and entertainment.85 Within each category are further
examples of covered entities, such as hotels, libraries, restau-
rants, parks, zoos, and private schools.86 Title III also expressly
bars associational discrimination.87
Titles IV and V of the ADA are somewhat more obscure. Title IV
addresses telephone and television access for people with hearing
and speech disabilities and requires that telecommunications com-
panies provide relay services for the hearing or speech-impaired.88
Title V sets forth miscellaneous provisions, including an anti-
retaliation provision, and authorizes attorney's fees for prevailing
parties.89
D. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA in Concert
Because both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA remain in
force today, many programs are subject to their overlapping stat-
utory provisions. For example, a student center at a public uni-
versity receiving state and federal funds would be subject to both
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA.90 A private
vendor with a license to operate within the student center, such
as a fast food restaurant or a bookstore, would also be subject to
the ADA's Title 111.91 The programs most likely to be affected by
the Rehabilitation Act (and therefore most likely to be subject to
the multiple overlapping provisions of that Act and the ADA) tend
to be institutions of higher education and healthcare institutions,
because these entities are by far the most likely to receive federal
83 ADA § 202, 104 Stat at 337, 42 USC § 12132.
84 See, for example, Cortez v City of Porterville, 5 F Supp 3d 1160, 1165 (ED Cal
2014); Innovative Health Systems, Inc v City of White Plains, 117 F3d 37, 47 (2d Cir 1997)
("Although courts generally should be reluctant to conclude that the omission of language
in one part of a statute that is included in another is unintentional . . . there is extensive
support in this instance to read the specific examples of discrimination from the other two
titles into Title II.").
85 See ADA § 302, 104 Stat at 355, 42 USC § 12182(a).
86 See Mezey, Disabling Interpretations at 109 (cited in note 18).
87 See ADA § 302, 104 Stat at 355, 42 USC § 12182(b)(1)(E).
88 See ADA § 302, 104 Stat at 355, 47 USC § 225 et seq.
89 See ADA § 503, 104 Stat at 370, 42 USC § 12203 et seq.
90 See Rothstein, 75 Ohio St L J at 1271 (cited in note 19).
91 Id. Both of the foregoing examples are Professor Laura Rothstein's.
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funding.92 The uncertain overlap of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act has resulted in confusion over whether and how the statutes
differ in coverage and remedies.
In order to avoid dismissal of the entire case based on an in-
correct choice of claim, plaintiffs frequently bring claims under
both statutes. 93 In most cases, however, litigating an ADA claim
and a Rehabilitation Act claim will yield the same result: if one
statute is found to have been violated, the other will likely be
found to have been violated as well. This is the natural conse-
quence of the statutes applying a similar standard when deter-
mining whether discrimination has occurred.94
While most courts read the substantive requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to be consistent with each other
in the majority of cases, differences in the statutes' remedies and
enforcement mechanisms do exist.95 Both the Rehabilitation Act
and Title II of the ADA allow for compensatory damages, attorney's
fees, and costs, for example, while Title III of the ADA provides
only for injunctive relief.96 Because of the differences in statutory
language and available remedies, some circuits resist reflexively
conflating the statutes. These courts recognize that a Rehabilita-
tion Act claim may succeed when an ADA claim would fail. To
provide one example, the Tenth Circuit has decided that while the
Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA's substantive standards
92 See id at 1270. See also, for example, Kellie Woodhouse, Impact of Pell Surge (Inside
Higher Ed, June 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/66FA-LZDN (reporting that federal
funding has surpassed state spending as the main source of public funding in higher edu-
cation, contributing nearly $76 billion to universities in 2013); Mary A. Laschober and
James C. Vertrees, Hospital Financing in the United States, in US Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Hospital Financing in Seven Countries 135, 136 (GPO 1995) (de-
lineating the many sources of financing for hospital services, including the federal Medicare
program and the joint federal-state Medicaid program).
93 See, for example, Henrietta D. v Bloomberg, 331 F3d 261, 264 (2d Cir 2003) (alleg-
ing violations of both statutes); Wisconsin Community Services, Inc v City of Milwaukee,
465 F3d 737, 740 (7th Cir 2006) (same); C.O. v Portland Public Schools, 679 F3d 1162,
1166 (9th Cir 2012) (same).
94 See, for example, Cummings v Norton, 393 F3d 1186, 1190 n 2 (10th Cir 2005)
("Because the language of disability used in the ADA mirrors that in the Rehabilitation
Act, we look to cases construing the Rehabilitation Act for guidance when faced with an
ADA challenge.") Some courts go even further and hold that compliance with one statute
necessarily means compliance with the other. See, for example, Thompson v Williamson
County, 219 F3d 555, 557 n 3 (6th Cir 2000) ("Because the ADA sets forth the same reme-
dies, procedures, and rights as the Rehabilitation Act, . . . claims brought under both stat-
utes may be analyzed together.").
95 See Rothstein, 75 Ohio St L J at 1270 (cited in note 19).
96 See id at 1302-03. The difference in available remedies has consequences for the
incentive structure for filing suit. See Part III.C.
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for determining what conduct constitutes employment discrimi-
nation, it does not incorporate the definition of who is covered un-
der the Act.97 Thus, because only the ADA has a built-in exception
for employers with fewer than fifteen employees, a plaintiff in the
Tenth Circuit may prevail on an employment discrimination
claim under the Rehabilitation Act against an employer with only
five employees.98 The Ninth Circuit has similarly decoupled the
standing requirements of the Rehabilitation Act from Title I of
the ADA and has held that independent contractors can bring em-
ployment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act
even though they are precluded from doing so under the ADA.99
Much less frequently discussed are the complex ways in which
the Rehabilitation Act and ADA Titles II and III interact with re-
gard to the doctrine known as statutory standing. The precise con-
tours of the population entitled to sue under each statute are one
area of potential divergence between the laws. Section 120a of the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978,100 which amends the language
of the original § 504 and is codified at 29 USC § 794a, prescribes
the following: "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . .. shall be available to any
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of
Federal assistance."101 Meanwhile, Title II of the ADA provides
that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in sec-
tion 794a [of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, proce-
dures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability"102 in violation of the an-
tidiscrimination provisions of Title II. Title III in turn states that
"[t]he remedies and procedures set forth in [the antidiscrimina-
tion provision] of this title are the remedies this subchapter pro-
vides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter."lo Because
the language is similar but not identical, there is room for parties
to debate whether the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, and
Title III of the ADA afford standing to identical groups of people.
97 See Schrader v Fred A. Ray, MD, PC, 296 F3d 968, 972 (10th Cir 2002).
98 See id at 969.
99 See, for example, Fleming v Yuma Regional Medical Center, 587 F3d 938, 939 (9th
Cir 2009).
100 Pub L No 95-602, 92 Stat 2955, codified as amended in various sections of Title 29.
101 Amendments of 1978 § 505, 92 Stat at 2983, 29 USC § 794a(2) (emphasis added).
102 ADA § 203, 104 Stat at 337, 42 USC § 12133 (emphasis added).
103 ADA § 308, 104 Stat at 363, 42 USC § 12188(a) (emphasis added).
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With the precise bounds of standing under the Rehabilitation
Act still undefined, it should not be surprising that a circuit split
has arisen over who is entitled to bring suit. While the Second
Circuit interprets the Rehabilitation Act's broad language as ex-
tending standing as broadly as Article III permits, the Eleventh
Circuit reads the Act's standing provision as coextensive with the
ADA, leading to a more restrictive interpretation that focuses on
locating a cause of action under the statute, not merely a concrete
and particularized injury.
II. THE PROPER SCOPE OF ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT: A CONTROVERSY
As Professor Joseph Vining famously wrote, it is impossible
to read the federal standing decisions "without coming away with
a sense of intellectual crisis. Judicial behavior is erratic, even bi-
zarre. The opinions and justifications do not illuminate."104 Other
scholars have been less charitable still. Alternately criticized as
"a word game played by secret rules"05 and a "largely meaningless
'litany' recited 'before the Court . . . chooses up sides and decides
the case,'"06 frustrations with the standing doctrine have led to
frequent pushes for reform, reconceptualization, and even out-
right abolishment.107
This confusion about the contours of the standing doctrine is
perhaps more understandable if one considers the law's current
state of flux. A number of Supreme Court decisions handed down
within the last five years have endeavored to clarify the intrica-
cies of standing;108 in so doing, they have cast the shape of the
104 Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 1 (Yale 1978). See
also Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Conn L Rev 677, 677
n 1 (1991).
105 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221, 221 (1988), citing
Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan dissenting).
106 Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 221 (cited in note 105), citing Abram Chayes, The Supreme
Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv L Rev
4, 22, 23 (1982).
107 See, for example, Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 223 (cited in note 106) (arguing for the
abolition of the injury requirement as a preliminary jurisdictional question in favor of an
early determination on the merits); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 Georgetown L
J 1191, 1195 (2014) (contending that courts should-and already do-award standing on
a "relative," as opposed to an "adequacy," basis).
108 See, for example, Spokeo, Inc v Robins, 136 S Ct 1540, 1550 (2016) (reaffirming
the importance of an alleged injury's "concreteness" in the standing analysis and clarifying
that "bare procedural violations" do not satisfy the demands of Article III).
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current doctrine into further doubt.10 With an eye toward synthe-
sizing the newer standing cases and the older opinions, Part II.A
outlines the several formulations of the standing doctrine as they
currently exist. Parts II.B and II.C explicate the circuit split that
has arisen over the scope of the Rehabilitation Act's associational
standing provision.
A. The Standing Doctrine's Several Faces
The three tenets of constitutional standing are now well rec-
ognized: To have standing under Article III's "case or controversy"
requirement,110 each claimant who asserts a cause of action must
demonstrate (a) an "'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest which is ... concrete and particularized . . . [and]
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.""' He must
also show (b) "a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of," and-finally-(c) it must be "likely," as op-
posed to "merely 'speculative,"' that "the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision."112 For a federal court to have jurisdiction
over a case, these three nonwaivable elements must be satisfied;
if no plaintiff can satisfy all of them at the outset of the litigation,
the case must be dismissed before reaching the merits.n1
Before the Supreme Court's Lexmark International, Inc v
Static Control Components, Inc"1 decision in 2014, federal courts
had imposed additional constraints on the judicial power when
"rule[s] of self-restraint"'1 might counsel the judiciary to avoid
adjudicating certain claims.116 Known as "prudential principles" or
the "prudential standing doctrine," these principles, though juris-
dictional, were usually considered waivable as long as Congress ex-
plicitly communicated its intent to override them.117 Although
there was some lingering confusion pre-Lexmark over which spe-
cific principles counted as prudential-and thus were required to
109 See Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a
Comeback?: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U Pa J
Const L 213, 263 (2015) (indicating that the Supreme Court's recent standing decisions
"answer[ I some questions, but leave many for another day").
110 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
111 Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560 (1992) (quotation marks omitted).
112 Id at 560-61.
113 See Friends of the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc, 528
US 167, 180 (2000).
114 134 S Ct 1377 (2014).
115 Barrows v Jackson, 346 US 249, 255 (1953).
116 Mank, 18 U Pa J Const L at 220 (cited in note 109).
117 See Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 99-100 (1979).
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be either satisfied or waived at the outset of the litigation-and
which counted as a nonjurisdictional part of the merits,118 the
broad strokes of the prudential standing doctrine were generally
agreed on. Courts customarily construed the doctrine to include
default prohibitions on raising a third party's legal rights in
court,11 9 litigating generalized grievances,120 and countenancing a
complaint that fell outside the "zone of interests" sought to be pro-
tected by the statute in question.121 This last principle, known var-
iously as "statutory standing" or "zone of interest" standing, was
predicated on the idea that Congress authorizes only certain
types of plaintiffs to sue under certain statutes.1 2
Even prior to Lexmark, there were murmurs of a coming
change. The Court had inconsistently applied the prudential
standing doctrine in at least two cases, contradicting itself-al-
beit arguably in dicta-about whether prudential standing was a
mandatory jurisdictional issue that required dismissal of a plain-
tiff's case at the outset of the litigation if its requirements were
not met or whether it was truly a merits issue. The stakes of this
determination were rather high: if the prudential standing doc-
trine were to be reclassified as part of the merits, it would allow
a court to continue hearing the case even if these previously
jurisdictional "principles of prudence" could not be satisfied123-a
move that would allow far more plaintiffs into court. The Court
had seemed to imply the former in Warth v Seldin"2 when it had
described the prudential standing doctrine as serving an essential
gatekeeping function by preventing federal courts from deciding
certain questions more appropriately addressed by the political
process.12' But in Allen v Wright,126 the Court had appeared to
118 See generally, for example, Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdic-
tional?, 64 Case W Reserve L Rev 413 (2013) (delineating the uncertainties of the doctrine).
119 See Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 499 (1975).
120 See id.
121 See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc v Camp, 397 US 150,
153 (1970). See also Part III.A.
122 See, for example, Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 97 n 2
(1998) (identifying the question of statutory standing as "whether this plaintiff has a cause
of action under the statute"); Davis v Passman, 442 US 228, 240 n 18 (1979) (distinguish-
ing the concepts of Article III standing and cause of action, and noting for the purposes of
statutory standing that "[w]hether petitioner has asserted a cause of action ... depends
not on the quality or extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which
petitioner is a member may use the courts to enforce the right at issue").
123 See Mank, 64 Case W Reserve L Rev at 426-29 (cited in note 118).
124 422 US 490 (1975).
125 Id at 500.
126 468 US 737 (1984).
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conclude the latter-that Article III standing, as the "most im-
portant" doctrine and the "core component" of the standing in-
quiry, might alone define the nondiscretionary limits on who may
bring a case in federal court.127
The Court ultimately did not go so far as to reclassify all of
the prudential standing requirements as part of the merits of a
case. It chose to uphold prudential standing as a jurisdictional
category. But in 2014, the Court conceded that pre-Lexmark case
law had improperly categorized the zone-of-interests inquiry as a
prudential standing requirement in the first place.128 Deeming the
"prudential standing . . . label misleading,"129 Justice Scalia de-
clared that "this inquiry" into the zone of interests sought to be
protected by the statute-which the Court admittedly had previ-
ously treated as "effectively jurisdictional"-is more properly
classified as a merits issue.130 Now, post-Lexmark, the answer to
the question posed by the zone-of-interests test-the question
whether a particular plaintiff has a congressionally approved
cause of action under the applicable statute-no longer deter-
mines whether a court has the power to hear the case. Rather, the
question itself is now part of the substantive merits of a claim.
And because the answer to the question is no longer a matter of
bare adjudicative jurisdiction but is instead the case's beating
heart, plaintiffs who would have seen their claims dismissed
much earlier under the pre-Lexmark scheme are now newly enti-
tled to a chance to prove the substance of their claims.131
Just because the zone-of-interests inquiry was downgraded
from a standing requirement to a merits question, however, does
not mean that it is not a necessary part of a court's analysis. Con-
ceding that characterizing the zone-of-interests test as a matter
of "statutory standing"132 was also "misleading" (albeit less mis-
leading than the language of prudential standing because it at
127 Id at 750-51.
128 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1387.
129 Id at 1386.
130 Id at 1387 n 4.
131 Adequately demonstrating that one's claim falls within the zone of interests that
Congress intended to protect requires one to demonstrate proximate (or legal) cause be-
tween the injury complained of and conduct sued on. See note 203 and accompanying text.
132 For those unfamiliar with the term, "statutory standing" is a bit of a paradox. Despite
the first half of its name, "statutory standing" once was capable of resolution prior to es-
tablishing Article III jurisdiction. And despite the other half of its name, "statutory stand-
ing" resembles the merits inquiries that courts have always performed, insofar as it ana-
lyzes the validity of the plaintiff's substantive claims. As Professor Richard M. Re writes,
"[t]his beast is neither fish nor fowl. It's time to ditch 'statutory standing' as, well, what it
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least "correctly place[d] the focus on the statute"),133 Scalia clari-
fied that the zone-of-interests limitation "always applies and is
never negated" when adjudicating statutorily created causes of
action.134 Thus, after Lexmark, federal courts must ask at the mer-
its stage whether a statute creating a private right of action au-
thorizes a particular plaintiff to sue. 135 While the significance of
this recategorization may be more psychological than practical, the
move sends a clear message to judges that they cannot simply dis-
miss a case at the outset for failing to satisfy the zone-of-interests
test.136
Interestingly, these two varieties of "standing"-Article III
standing on the one hand and the previously prudential zone-of-
interests "standing" inquiry (still sometimes known by the slight
misnomer "statutory standing"137) on the other-have come up
against each other in the context of Rehabilitation Act associa-
tional standing. The next two Sections explore the emerging
circuit split over the proper scope of associational standing under
the Rehabilitation Act.
B. The Second Circuit's Broad Interpretation of Standing:
Constitutional Minimum
The first appellate court to consider the scope of associational
standing under the Rehabilitation Act was the Second Circuit in
Loeffler v Staten Island University Hospital.138 In 1991, Robert
Loeffler, a deaf individual, was admitted to Staten Island Univer-
sity Hospital for heart surgery. His family attempted to get an
American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter at that time, but none
always was: the merits. The Court does so, in Lexmark." Richard M. Re, The Doctrine
Formerly Known as "Statutory Standing" (Re's Judicata, Aug 27, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/36W4-5ZM4.
133 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1387 n 4 (emphasis added).
134 Id at 1388.
135 The exact contours of the statute's zone of interests, however, remain open to de-
bate by the parties.
136 See Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1388. The obligation to hear the case past the pleading
stage is in line with "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise
the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water Conservation District v United States,
424 US 800, 817 (1976).
137 See Re, The Doctrine Formerly Known As (cited in note 132); Radha A. Pathak,
Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 Okla L Rev 89, 95 (2009) (recognizing
the strangeness of the term).
138 582 F3d 268 (2d Cir 2009).
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was provided, and Robert's children Bobby (age nine at the time)
and Kristy (age twelve) ended up providing interpretation.139
Four years later, Robert was admitted to the hospital for an-
other heart procedure. The hospital again failed to provide an
ASL interpreter, and interpreting for Robert again fell to Bobby,
then thirteen. When Robert suffered a stroke after surgery, Bobby
explained to the doctor that he did not "feel comfortable" inter-
preting for his father and that he "[did not] understand some of
the terms."140 While the doctor assured Bobby that he was "doing
just fine," Bobby later testified that he found the experience of
being responsible for relaying medical information "amazingly
overwhelming" and "traumatiz[ing]."141 He also confided to his sis-
ter that he "felt responsible for failing to help his father."142 Both
Bobby and his sister missed school in order to remain on duty as
interpreters.143
After the ordeal was over, the Loefflers sued for injunctive
relief under the ADA and for monetary damages under the
Rehabilitation Act.144 Because neither Kristy nor Bobby was a dis-
abled person within the meaning of the statutes, their discrimina-
tion claims were based on an associational discrimination theory:
they alleged that the hospital discriminated against them not be-
cause they themselves were disabled, but because they were "as-
sociated with their disabled parents."145 The district court dis-
missed Kristy and Bobby's associational discrimination claims
under the Rehabilitation Act for lack of standing because neither
child had personally been denied any services at the hospital.146
The Second Circuit, however, reversed, holding that Kristy
and Bobby in fact had standing to bring their associational claims
under the Rehabilitation Act.14 The court stated that nondisabled
parties bringing associational claims need prove only an "inde-
pendent injury causally related to the denial of federally required
services" to a disabled person with whom the nondisabled plaintiffs
139 Id at 271.
140 Id at 272.
141 Id at 272-73.
142 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 273.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Loeffler v Staten Island University Hospital, 2007 W L 805802, *6 (EDNY).
146 Id at *7.
147 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 279.
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are associated-that is, satisfy Article III's injury requirement.14s
By virtue of "being compelled to provide sign language interpre-
tation, forced truancy from school, and involuntary exposure to
their father's suffering," both children were injured in an Article III
sense and thus were "person[s] aggrieved" within the meaning of
the statute.149 Citing dicta from Innovative Health Systems, Inc v
City of White Plains,', construing the Rehabilitation Act's stand-
ing language as broadly as is constitutionally permissible, the
Second Circuit held that "the injury need not necessarily be lim-
ited to an inability to provide services to disabled persons."151 A
person bringing an associational discrimination claim is not re-
quired to prove that they were "excluded from participation in,
denied the benefit of, or discriminated against under a federally
assisted program" as long as their injury causally results from
such a denial to someone else.152
In so holding, the Second Circuit focused on the statutory lan-
guage, noting that the text-"any person aggrieved by any act or
failure to act"153-plainly included nondisabled individuals within
its scope. This language, to the court, evinced on its face "a con-
gressional intention to define standing to bring a private action
under [the Rehabilitation Act] .. . as broadly as is permitted by
Article III."154 In other words, the Loeffler court concluded that a
person can be aggrieved by the denial of benefits (that is, have
their legal rights adversely affected) without actually being denied
the benefits themselves.
148 Id (Wesley concurring). A majority of the panel concluded that the children did
have standing to bring an associational claim under the Rehabilitation Act. The concur-
ring opinion of Judge Richard Wesley constitutes the opinion of the court on this issue
only. See id at 277 (Jacobs) ("For the reasons set forth in the concurring opinion of Judge
Wesley, a majority of this panel concludes that the children do have standing .... I dissent
.... My reasons are set forth in a separate, dissenting opinion.").
149 Id at 279 (Wesley concurring).
150 117 F3d 37 (2d Cir 1997).
151 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 282 (Wesley concurring), citing Innovative Health Systems,
117 F3d at 47.
152 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 282 (Wesley concurring).
153 See 29 USC § 794(a).
154 See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 280 (Wesley concurring) (quotation marks omitted), quot-
ing Innovative Health Systems, 117 F3d at 47. Conspicuously lacking from the court's pre-
Lexmark analysis is any discussion of whether associational plaintiffs, though injured, are
necessarily entitled to recovery under the statute. This marks the point at which the
Second and Eleventh Circuits diverge, as the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of this issue
came down shortly after Lexmark was decided. While Lexmark may be partially to blame
for the split and does mandate a new approach to handling the associational standing
question, it does not foreclose the result reached in Loeffler. For a discussion of this issue,
see Part II.C.
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The dissent, however, expressed concern with this broad
standard and noted that prior cases, including Innovative Health
Systems, dealt with nondisabled plaintiffs who were denied bene-
fits, "albeit on the basis of their association with disabled per-
sons."155 Kristy and Bobby, by contrast, were denied no services.
The dissent argued that the majority's rule would have wide-
ranging and unwise implications: "Once a breach of duty is found
under the RA, everybody and his mother (literally) will be able to
submit a bill for services or injuries."15 Forecasting a cycle of un-
ending liability in which a hospital "might have to pay twice or
many times over for each service it failed to afford," the dissent
foresaw liability in a case in which "a relative prepares a gluten-
free meal that a hospital lacks resources to provide, and thereby
incurs expense, or gets burned on the stove."157
C. The Eleventh Circuit's Stricter Standard of Recovery: Cause
of Action
In contrast to the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act's "any person aggrieved" language as coexten-
sive with Article III standing, the next appellate court to address
the scope of the provision took a more restrictive tack. Purport-
edly following the newly issued158 Lexmark decision's mandate to
locate a cause of action under the statute, the Eleventh Circuit in
McCullum v Orlando Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc159 di-
verged sharply from the Loeffler court's generous conception of
associational standing. McCullurm presented facts very similar to
those in Loeffler: At fourteen years old, D.F., who is deaf and
mute, was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis and was hospitalized
for several weeks while undergoing treatment. 60 In order to com-
municate with him, the staff at both hospitals used written notes
and visual aids and also relied on his parents and deaf sister, who
communicated with him via sign language.
155 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 284 (Jacobs dissenting). In Innovative Health Systems, an out-
patient drug and alcohol rehabilitation center was denied a building permit by the city
zoning board on account of the center's connection with individuals meeting the statutory
definition of disability. See Innovative Health Systems, 117 F3d at 40.
156 Loeffler, 582 F3d at 287 (Jacobs dissenting).
157 Id (Jacobs dissenting).
158 Lexmark came down five years after Loeffler was decided and six months before
McCullum. It is at least partially to blame for the circuit split. See Part III.
159 768 F3d 1135 (11th Cir 2014).
160 Id at 1138.
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After D.F. was discharged from the hospital, his parents sued
both on their own behalf and on behalf of D.F. and his deaf sister,
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability under both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.161 The district court dismissed
the individual claims brought by D.F.'s parents and sister for lack
of standing,162 reasoning that their stress and frustration at being
unable to communicate effectively did not constitute a cogniza-
ble injury under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.163 The
parents then appealed the dismissal of their associational dis-
crimination claim. They appealed to the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Loeffler, arguing that the district court interpreted the
standing requirements of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
too narrowly.164
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Loeffler
and holding that D.F.'s parents and sister lacked statutory stand-
ing under both acts because they were not "personally excluded,
personally denied benefits, or personally discriminated against
because of their association with a disabled person."165 In reaching
this conclusion, the court purported to heed Lexmark's directive
to determine whether "under a proper construction of the statute
... [their] claim ... fall[s] within the cause of action created by
the statute."166 To determine the statute's "proper construction,"
the court read the ADA's standing language-declaring it "dis-
criminatory to exclude or otherwise deny equal goods, services,
. .. or other opportunities to any individual" because of that indi-
vidual's association with a disabled person-back into the
Rehabilitation Act and construed the two statutes as having the
same preliminary jurisdictional standard.167 As the court noted,
the ADA expressly instructs that "nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied
161 McCullum v Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc, 2013 WL 1212860, *1
(MD Fla).
162 For a reminder on the standing-versus-merits confusion surrounding statutory
standing, see Part II.A. See also text accompanying note 122. The district-court and ap-
pellate decisions in the McCullum litigation straddle the period pre- and post-Lexmark, so
even though Lexmark redefined this cause of action-driven type of "standing" as a merits
issue, the courts may be applying the terminology inconsistently. Here, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the associational claims for lack of a cause of action.
163 McCullum, 2013 WL 1212860 at *5.
164 McCullum, 768 F3d at 1141.
165 Id at 1143.
166 Id at 1145.
167 Id at 1142, quoting 42 USC § 12182(b)(1)(E).
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under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."168 Because the
ADA permits suits by nondisabled plaintiffs only when they have
suffered exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination because of
their association with a disabled person, allowing standing for in-
juries beyond personal exclusion, personal denial of benefits, and
personal discrimination would mean that the Rehabilitation Act
was functioning as a ceiling on protection from discrimination in-
stead of a floor, in direct contradiction to Congress's instructions.169
Relatedly, the court observed that allowing nondisabled
plaintiffs to seek relief under the Rehabilitation Act for injuries
other than exclusion, denial of benefits, and discrimination that
they themselves experienced would mean that nondisabled indi-
viduals have more rights under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA
than the disabled possess. The logic is that while disabled individ-
uals can recover only if they are personally excluded, denied ben-
efits, or discriminated against on the basis of their disability, non-
disabled plaintiffs would be able to recover for both the personal
denial of benefits and services as well as for more attenuated in-
juries.170 The McCullum court considered this definitive proof of
their narrow interpretation of both acts given that "Congress en-
acted both laws to promote the rights of the disabled."171 Reading
this intention narrowly, the court appeared to assume that pro-
moting the rights of the disabled foreclosed granting greater
rights to nondisabled plaintiffs even if those additional rights
broadly furthered the law's antidiscrimination mission. Expressly
rejecting the Second Circuit's reasoning in Loeffler, the Eleventh
Circuit asserted that the associational standing provision of the
Rehabilitation Act "should not be interpreted irrespective" of
§ 794(a).172 Because the court's interpretation of congressional in-
tent led it to believe that nondisabled plaintiffs only had stand-
ing to sue if personally denied benefits or services, D.F.'s parents
and sister did not have a cause of action and were not entitled to
recovery. 173
McCullum's narrowing of the scope of associational standing
has gained traction at the district-court level. In Collins v
168 McCullum, 768 F3d at 1142, quoting 42 USC § 12201(a).
169 McCullum, 768 F3d at 1143.
170 See 29 USC § 794(a); 42 USC § 12182.
171 McCullum, 768 F3d at 1144.
172 Id (quotation marks omitted).
173 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit expressed disagreement with the Second Circuit's
factual determination that "nondisabled persons are denied benefits when a hospital relies
on them to help interpret for a deaf patient." Id.
[84:12851308
2017] Revitalizing the Law That "Preceded the Movement"
Dartmouth -Hitchcock Medical Center,174 a district court in New
Hampshire confronted a set of facts similar to those at issue in
both Loeffler and McCullum: Colleen Collins, who has had hear-
ing loss since childhood, began seeing Dr. James Saunders in
2009 to inquire about replacing her failing cochlear implant.175
Colleen and her doctor communicated primarily through voice
and lip reading; no ASL interpreter took part in their presurgical
appointments.16 In 2011, Colleen was scheduled for surgery.
Colleen's sisters, Ruth and Debra, accompanied her, but Saunders
was not able to replace the implant at the time because of an un-
expected complication during surgery. As a result, Colleen was
left completely deaf, and she and the doctor communicated
through written notes and through Debra. It fell to Debra to ex-
plain to Colleen what was happening and to reassure her panick-
ing sister that she was "not going to die."177 Debra and Ruth sub-
sequently brought an associational discrimination claim against
the hospital under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, alleging
discrimination on the basis of their association with their deaf
sister.178
Citing McCullum, the court dismissed Ruth and Debra's as-
sociational discrimination claims for lack of standing. The court
held that "[p]ersons who are not themselves disabled have stand-
ing to bring a claim under the ADA only if [they were] personally
discriminated against or denied some benefit because of [their]
association with a disabled person."179 The court further held that
the Rehabilitation Act allows claims by nondisabled individuals
only if they "suffer injury because they were subjected to conduct
proscribed by the Act"-that is, they were "excluded from the par-
ticipation in, . . . denied the benefits of, or . . . subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."180 Thus, the court essentially conflated
standing under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, reading the
provisions of both statutes to be coextensive with one another.
A district court in Minnesota came to the same conclusion in
Durand v Fairview Health Services.181 In that case, Shaun Durand
174 2015 WL 268842 (D NH).
175 Id at *1.
176 Id at *1-2.
177 Id at *2-4.
178 Collins, 2015 WL 268842 at *4.
179 Id at *8.
180 Id (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted).
181 2017 WL 217649 (D Minn).
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was admitted to the intensive care unit at Fairview Ridges Hospital
after an exacerbation of his congestive heart failure.182 Shaun,
who was not deaf, was accompanied by his deaf parents-Roger
and Linda-and his hearing sister, Priscilla.183 As in the Loeffler,
McCullum, and Collins cases, however, the defendant hospital re-
peatedly failed to provide an ASL interpreter to the family.184
Linda and Roger thus relied on Priscilla to sign the information
that the doctor was conveying.185 Priscilla later claimed to have ex-
perienced "stress and anxiety while having to serve as healthcare
agent and [facilitator of] communications" for her parents, and she
claimed that her discomfort was "multiplied by the fact that she
[did] not know sign language fluently and was dealing with her
grief and other emotions while watching her brother die."186
Citing both McCullum and Collins, the court dismissed
Priscilla's Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims: under either stat-
ute, nondisabled plaintiffs may only recover for "the exclusion, de-
nial of benefits, or discrimination that they themselves suf-
fer[ed."187 Absent "evidence in the record of any benefit, good, or
service that Fairview denied Priscilla based on her association
with Roger and Linda," her injury was not actionable under either
statute.1 88 Agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, the court reasoned
that the narrow approach "best hews to the statutory language"
and "heeds the Supreme Court's admonition that the law must
balance 'two powerful but countervailing considerations-the
need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to
keep [the statutes] within manageable bounds."'189
One gets the sense that the Second and Eleventh Circuits are
engaging with each other at cross-purposes. While the Second Cir-
cuit asks only whether an associational plaintiff can demonstrate
182 Id at *1.
183 Id.
184 Id at *2-3. Roger and Linda identified at least three instances in which Shaun
received medical treatment without an interpreter present.
185 Durand, 2017 WL 217649 at *2.
186 Id at *7.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Durand, 2017 WL 217649 at *7, quoting Alexander v Choate, 469 US 287, 298-
99 (1985).
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an injury in fact that comes within the broad reaches of Arti-
cle 111,190 the Eleventh Circuit circumscribes standing to those
who themselves have been denied a disability-related benefit or
been personally subjected to the discrimination proscribed by the
Act.191 The latter standard-by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate
not only that he was injured by the defendant's conduct but also
that he has a claim under the statute for which Congress intended
to allow recovery-imposes a significantly higher burden on a
would-be plaintiff than a standard requiring only the allegation
of an injury in fact.
III. WALKING JUSTICE SCALIA'S TIGHTROPE: A PROPOSAL
As discussed in Part II.A, Justice Scalia, in Lujan v Defenders
of Wildlife,192 set out the three Article III or "constitutional" re-
quirements for demonstrating standing to sue: an injury in fact, a
causal connection, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision on the merits.193 Even when Article III
standing requirements are satisfied, however, additional "pru-
dential" requirements often apply; while Congress may waive
them, they must do so explicitly.194 These requirements are based
not on the Constitution but on principles of prudent judicial ad-
ministration and include further, self-imposed limitations on the
judicial power, including the general prohibition against raising
another person's legal rights in court1 95 and the rule barring adju-
dication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed
by the political process. Finally, the requirement that a plaintiffs
complaint fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the law
invoked, while no longer an issue of prudential standing, is nev-
ertheless mandatory for statutorily created causes of action and
is never negated.196
Neither circuit in this split used the language of prudential
standing. Further, neither circuit purported to consider whether
associational plaintiffs fall within the zone of interests sought to
be protected by the Rehabilitation Act. Nevertheless, the Second
and Eleventh Circuits appear to have employed competing tests
190 See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 280 (Wesley concurring). See also Part II.A.
191 See McCullum, 768 F3d at 1143. See also Part II.B.
192 504 US 555 (1992).
193 Id at 560.
194 See Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 99-100 (1979).
195 See note 6 and accompanying text.
196 See Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1386.
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when determining which plaintiffs may sue under an associa-
tional discrimination theory. Per Loeffler, the Second Circuit asks
only whether an associational plaintiff can demonstrate a consti-
tutional injury.197 Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit, in and follow-
ing McCullum, attempts to locate a cause of action under the stat-
ute in addition to a constitutionally cognizable injury.198 By
requiring a plaintiff to prove that she belongs to the class of peo-
ple that Congress intended the statute to protect-that is, that
the statute expressly prohibits discrimination against her person-
ally-the latter standard restricts disability discrimination pro-
tection to a smaller class of would-be plaintiffs.
This Part argues that neither circuit was entirely correct in
its analysis. It is true that interpreting the Rehabilitation Act's
standing provision as broadly as the Constitution permits would
secure greater access to the courts for individuals with disabilities
and their families and would thus be an enticing proposition for
the disability rights community. The Lexmark decision, however,
likely forecloses that mode of analysis: Loeffler's method, if not its
result, is likely dead. Post-Lexmark, federal courts adjudicating
claims arising under statutorily created causes of action must
confine recovery to the class of plaintiffs for whom Congress
intended to authorize suit.199 It is unlikely, therefore, that the
Loeffler court could now grant recovery for an injury satisfying
Article III requirements without undertaking a zone-of-interests
analysis-an analysis that in turn relies on the traditional tools
of statutory interpretation.200 And, to that end, while statutory lan-
guage identical to that in the Rehabilitation Act conferring stand-
ing on "any person aggrieved" has traditionally been interpreted
broadly by the courts,201 recent, post-Loeffler Supreme Court juris-
prudence202 counsels against reading the phrase "any person ag-
grieved" to be coextensive with Article III's injury requirement.
At the same time, these recent cases suggest that the McCullum
court's reading of the phrase was unduly narrow. While the
Eleventh Circuit did recognize the necessity of performing a
197 See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 280 (Wesley concurring). See also Part I.B.
198 See McCullum, 768 F3d at 1143. See also Part II.C.
199 See Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1388. See also Part II.A.
200 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1387.
201 See Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11, 19 (1998) ("History associ-
ates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly.").
202 See, for example, Thompson v North American Stainless, LP, 562 US 170, 177
(2011). See also Part III.A.
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cause-of-action analysis in light of Lexmark, it fell short in imple-
menting that test in the analytically precise manner necessary to
reach the right conclusion. That is, in neglecting to explicitly and
thoroughly define the applicable zone of interests in the decision,
the court declined to consider whether the class of people that
Congress authorized to sue under the Rehabilitation Act might
include associational plaintiffs injured in an Article III sense by
discriminatory conduct without personally being denied benefits
or services. After all, although the zone-of-interests inquiry is now
a mandatory aspect of resolution on the merits for statutory
claims, the precise contours of the interests that Congress in-
tended to protect are open to debate. The width of the zone, in other
words, remains contested. In performing an underdeveloped cause-
of-action analysis that failed to take into account the flexibility of
the zone's contours, however, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a nar-
row standard without considering the Rehabilitation Act's facially
broad language and its history as a piece of civil rights-era
legislation.
A more compelling interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act's
standing provision would avoid the extremes of both Article III
standing and the McCullum court's narrow statutory construc-
tion, incorporating a lenient zone-of-interests test that recognizes
the viability of suits brought by associational plaintiffs while sim-
ultaneously confining standing to those plaintiffs who can
demonstrate injuries sufficiently related to the defendant's con-
duct to satisfy proximate (or legal) cause. 203 It is not the case that
a standing regime more restrictive than Article III would neces-
sarily sound a death knell for associational plaintiffs in disability
discrimination cases. The zone-of-interests test as formulated in
Lexmark is one of flexible breadth that varies according to the
provisions of law at issue.204 Courts should prefer a lenient test in
the Rehabilitation Act context given the plain language of the Act,
the substantial latitude that Congress has granted the courts in
adjudicating the Act, and the advantages that a lower bar to entry
to federal court would have for deterring discriminatory behavior.
Part III.A proceeds by considering the Supreme Court prece-
dent on statutes that, like the Rehabilitation Act, confer standing
203 That is, the plaintiff should be able to show not only that the defendant's conduct
in fact caused her injury, but also that the harm flowing from the defendant's conduct
bears some reasonable relationship to that conduct. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 29
(2010); Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1390-91.
204 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1389.
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on "any person aggrieved." It advocates for adopting a common
usage of the phrase that recently found favor in an employment
discrimination case arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
It further argues that courts should be generous in construing the
dimensions of the zone of interests sought to be protected by the
Rehabilitation Act. Such a generous standard would afford pro-
tection for associational plaintiffs while also alleviating the
Loeffler dissent's concerns about limitless liability for a single in-
jury. Part III.B argues that adopting a broad standard for stand-
ing-a position that can be achieved by incorporating a lenient
version of the zone-of-interests test-would also aid in deterring
discriminatory behavior and potentially lead to expanded protec-
tions for individuals with disabilities.
A. A Middle Ground
With a zone-of-interests inquiry now mandatory for every
statutorily created cause of action, the first step of the merits de-
termination is to ask whether the plaintiff "falls within the class
of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue."205 That ques-
tion "requires [the court] to determine the meaning of the con-
gressionally enacted provision creating a cause of action . . . ap-
ply[ing] traditional principles of statutory interpretation."206
When interpreting statutes, the Supreme Court typically lets
plain language be its guide. Dictionaries are consulted.207 And
"any person" usually means "any person." In United States v
Gonzales,208 for instance, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated
that "[r]ead naturally, the word 'any' has an expansive meaning
that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind."'209
To that end, and in conjunction with the dictionary defini-
tions of "any"210 and "every,"211 the Court has historically inter-
preted statutory language conferring standing on "any person
aggrieved" to mean just that-"any person" adversely affected by
the proscribed conduct may sue. In one early antidiscrimination
205 Id at 1387.
206 Id at 1388.
207 See generally John Calhoun, Note, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in
Supreme Court and Circuit Court'Dictionary Use, 124 Yale L J 484 (2014).
208 520 US 1 (1997).
209 Id at 5.
210 Merriam-Webster defines "any" as "one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 56 (11th ed 2005).
211 Merriam-Webster defines "every" as "being each individual or part of a group with-
out exception." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 433 (cited in note 210).
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case, Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co,212 one black
and one white resident of an apartment complex filed suit to en-
join the owner's discriminatory housing practices that disadvan-
taged black applicants.13 Because Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968214 (the Fair Housing Act) authorizes suit by "[any person
who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice . . . (hereafter "person aggrieved),"215 both plaintiffs ar-
gued that they had standing to sue notwithstanding their race. 216
Citing the Third Circuit's opinion in Hackett v McGuire Brothers,
Inc,217 the Supreme Court agreed that even the white resident had
standing; even though he himself was not the target of the owner's
discrimination, the deprivation of an opportunity to live in a ra-
cially integrated community made him an "aggrieved" person un-
der the statute.218 Eight years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Trafficante's expansive interpretation of "any persons aggrieved,"
indicating in Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood219 that even
"test" plaintiffs in the fair housing context had standing under
Title VIII because the language of the statute evinced a congres-
sional intent to extend standing as "broad[ly] as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution."220
The next two cases to interpret "any person" did so outside
the context of antidiscrimination law. In Bennett v Spear,221 ranch
operators and irrigation districts filed suit under the citizen-suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act222 (ESA), which author-
izes "any person [to] commence a civil suit."223 The plaintiffs con-
tended that the Fish and Wildlife Service's proposed use of reser-
voir water to protect an endangered species of fish would result
in less water available for their irrigation needs, thereby harming
212 409 US 205 (1972).
213 Id at 206-08.
214 Pub L 90-284, 82 Stat 81, codified at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
215 Fair Housing Act § 810(a), 82 Stat at 85 (emphasis added).
216 Trafficante, 409 US at 206 n 1 (emphasis added), quoting Fair Housing Act
§ 810(a), 82 Stat at 85, 42 USC § 3610(a).
217 445 F2d 442, 446 (3d Cir 1971) (explaining that "the language 'a person claiming
to be aggrieved' shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is per-
mitted by Article III of the Constitution").
218 See Trafficante, 409 US at 211-12.
219 441 US 91 (1979).
220 Id at 109. The plaintiffs' theory of Article III injury was based on allegations that
they had been deprived of the "social and professional benefits of living in an integrated
society." Id at 111.
221 520 US 154 (1997).
222 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973), codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq.
223 Bennett, 520 US at 164, quoting ESA § 11, 87 Stat at 900, 16 USC § 1540(g).
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their commercial activities and violating the ESA.224 After survey-
ing previous interpretations of broad statutory language, the
Supreme Court found standing: even though the plaintiffs sought
to prevent the application of environmental restrictions rather
than to sue private violators of those restrictions or assert their
underenforcement, Scalia, citing Trafficante, concluded that
Congress's use of the phrase "any person" demonstrated a con-
gressional intent to expand standing to the maximum permitted
under Article II.225 And in Federal Election Commission v
Akins,226 the Court granted standing to a group of voters who were
denied certain campaign finance information, this time citing
Bennett and remarking in the process that "[h]istory associates
the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the stand-
ing net broadly-beyond the common-law interests and substan-
tive statutory rights upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally
rested."227
More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, counsels
against taking the continued viability of the expansive interpreta-
tion for granted. Newer cases suggest instead that courts should
walk a tightrope between the extremes of Article III standing and
a rigid construction of the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue under
a given statute. In Thompson v North American Stainless, LP,228
an employee brought an action against his employer for a retali-
atory firing decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.229
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, sharply criticized dicta in
the Trafficante opinion (a Title VIII case) that suggested that stat-
utory language conferring standing to "any person aggrieved" in the
Title VII context would also reach as far as permitted by Arti-
cle I1.230 Deeming that notion "too expansive" and "ill-considered,"231
the Court instead proposed treading a middle course.
Like the warring circuits behind Loeffler and McCullum, the
Thompson parties disagreed on how to construe Congress's "any
person aggrieved" language. At one extreme, the plaintiff-employee
argued for an interpretation as expansive as the Constitution
224 Bennett, 520 US at 160.
225 Id at 165.
226 524 US 11 (1998).
227 Id at 19.
228 562 US 170 (2011). This case was decided after Loeffler but before McCullum,
Collins, and Durand.
229 Thompson, 562 US at 172.
230 Id at 176.
231 Id.
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would allow.232 This is the position that the Loeffler court ad-
vanced. At the other extreme, the defendant-employer argued
that "person aggrieved" was a term of art that referred only to the
employee who was the subject of the retaliatory conduct-a posi-
tion analogous to the McCullum court's narrow reading of the
class of people entitled to sue under the statute. 233 Like the
defendant-hospital in McCullum, the defendant-employer in
Thompson urged the Court to construe that class narrowly to en-
compass only those who were personally subject to the discrimi-
natory conduct proscribed by the act-here, those who suffered
retaliation personally.234 The Court rejected both arguments, the
former on the grounds that it would lead to a never-ending cycle
of liability235 and the latter as inconsistent with the statute's
text.2 3 6 If Congress had intended to restrict standing solely to the
target of retaliatory conduct, the Court reasoned, "it would more
naturally have said 'person claiming to have been discriminated
against' rather than 'person claiming to be aggrieved."'237
The Court thus announced a middle course that manages
both to avoid the extremity of equating "person aggrieved" with
Article III standing and yet is "fully consistent" with the Court's
application of the term in Trafficante: a generously construed
zone of interests that recognizes that individuals can be "ag-
grieved" by discrimination without themselves being subject to
the precise discriminatory conduct that the act prohibits.238 In-
deed, the breadth of this test as announced was expansive, ena-
bling suit by any plaintiff with an interest "arguably sought to be
protected by the statute" and denying standing only if "the plain-
tiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be as-
sumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."239 The expan-
sive language of the Thompson-endorsed zone of interests, which
232 See id at 175.
233 See Thompson, 562 US at 177.
234 See id.
235 These are the same concerns raised by the dissent in the Second Circuit's Loeffler
decision. See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 287 (Jacobs dissenting) (expressing dismay at the ma-
jority's evident lack of a limiting principle).
236 See Thompson, 562 US at 177-78.
237 Id at 177 (emphasis added).
238 Id (citations omitted). Although this case prefigures Lexmark's adoption of a man-
datory zone-of-interests test for all statutorily created causes of action, see Part IIA,
Scalia, who authored both opinions, applies that test here.
239 Id at 178 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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amounts almost to a default rule in favor of inclusion in that case,
indicates that the breadth of the zone can be quite wide indeed.
It is worth emphasizing that Thompson, because it interprets
an entirely different statute, is not binding on the associational
standing issue under the Rehabilitation Act. While Thompson
endorsed a wide zone in the Title VII context, principles of statu-
tory interpretation must ultimately drive the determination of
the proper zone of interests in the Rehabilitation Act context. To
that end, the next Section argues that the zone of interests for
associational plaintiffs under the Rehabilitation Act should be in-
terpreted broadly based on the Act's statutory language.
B. A Wide Zone of Interests
The zone-of-interests test is not only required but also desir-
able insofar as it presents an elegant solution to the Loeffler dis-
sent's concerns about unlimited liability: proximate cause. Unlike
the Article III injury test, which requires only that the injury
complained of be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, the
zone-of-interest inquiry requires a plaintiffs injury to be proxi-
mately caused by the defendant-that is, it requires the injury
flowing from the defendant's conduct to bear a sufficiently close
relationship to that conduct that it would not be unfair to hold the
defendant accountable.240 Courts and scholars have long recog-
nized that the "fairly traceable" standard is more lenient than
proximate cause.241 Indeed, because the latter is ultimately a mat-
ter of best-guess line drawing driven by policy considerations,242
it offers built-in protection against attenuated injuries-exactly
the sort of marginal, too-remote claims that compose the Loeffler
dissent's "hypothetical list of horrors."243
Using the proximate cause standard, courts would be able to
deny standing to associational plaintiffs with injuries too attenu-
ated and unforeseeable to countenance-such as a relative who
burns herself on the stove while preparing a gluten-free meal that
a hospital was obligated but failed to provide-while affording
240 See Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1390 (describing proximate causation as the question
"whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute
prohibits").
241 See, for example, Steven G. Davison, Standing to Sue in Citizen Suits against Air
and Water Polluters under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 17 Tulane Envir L J 63, 66-67 (2003).
242 See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 29 (2010).
243 See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 283 (Wesley concurring) (describing the dissenting judge's
list of negative consequences).
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standing to those plaintiffs whose injuries flow directly and fore-
seeably from the discriminatory conduct.244 Drawing an equiva-
lent line is not possible using the "fairly traceable" standard,
however, as that element merely requires a showing that there is
a "substantial likelihood" that the defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiffs injury.245 The latter standard will be satisfied by remote
as well as direct injuries.246
An analogy to tort law may be instructive on this point. Recall
the classic hypothetical from first-year Torts, straight from the
pages of the Restatement (Third): Richard, a hunter, hands his
loaded shotgun to his neighbor's three-year-old daughter. The
daughter drops the shotgun, breaking her toe. Although Richard
is negligent for giving a small child a loaded deadly weapon, the
risk that made Richard's conduct negligent is that she would
shoot someone with the gun, not that she would hurt herself by
dropping it (assuming, as the Restatement does, that the gun was
not especially heavy or unwieldy). Her broken toe is outside the
scope of Richard's liability-that is, proximate cause bars her
recovery for this unforeseen injury even though Richard's negli-
gence was its cause in fact.247 In the standing context, the "fairly
traceable" standard functions similarly to cause in fact by sweep-
ing within its purview all injuries that are causally related to the
244 Under this formulation, foreseeable stress, anxiety, and annoyance that results
from a hospital's reliance on family members to convey medical information to deaf pa-
tients should satisfy proximate cause.
245 Davison, 17 Tulane Envir L J at 66 (cited in note 241). The "fairly traceable" stand-
ard appears to be essentially the same as but-for causation in that it asks whether the
defendant in fact caused the plaintiffs injury, regardless of the foreseeability of harm. See
Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 Fordham
L Rev 1241, 1253 (2011). Proximate cause, by contrast, is concerned with reasonableness:
Is there a close enough connection between the defendant's action and the plaintiffs injury
that it makes sense to hold the defendant accountable? To continue with the example from
above, most courts would probably find the meal-preparing relative's burns to be too un-
foreseeable and tenuously connected to the hospital's failure to provide gluten-free meals
to consider it reasonably responsible. On the other hand, a family member's mental an-
guish stemming from conscription into ASL translation is likely a foreseeable result of a
hospital's failure to provide accommodations for the hard of hearing.
246 While the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined the "fairly traceable" stand-
ard as coextensive with a cause-in-fact analysis, a number of decisions support the analogy.
See Meier, 80 Fordham L Rev at 1241-59 (cited in note 245) (collecting cases). See also,
for example, Duke Power Co v Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc, 438 US 59, 74
(1978) (finding a "fairly traceable" connection by deferring to the district court's conclusion
that a but-for causal link existed); Allen, 468 US at 737 (questioning the existence of a but-
for causal link between the plaintiff s injury and the alleged illegal conduct and declining
to find a "fairly traceable" injury on those grounds).
.247 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 29, cmt d, illus 3 (2010).
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defendant's conduct248-a prospect that would surely alarm any
court concerned with the lack of a imiting principle. The proxi-
mate cause standard, by contrast, contains a built-in safety valve.
It would allow a court to grant standing for injuries for which the
scope of the risk was foreseeable but deny it for attenuated inju-
ries-those for which holding the defendant accountable would be
unreasonable, inefficient, or unfair. A court employing a proxi-
mate cause standard in the associational standing context, there-
fore, could comfortably grant standing to Bobby Loeffler and to
D.F. McCullum's parents without fear of tumbling down a slip-
pery slope toward the meal-preparing relative.
In Lexmark, it is true, Scalia emphasized that not every zone-
of-interests inquiry will merit the "lenient approach" and "gener-
ous review provisions" afforded to the claims in that case.249 Wile
the test as formulated in Lexmark was "not especially demand-
ing" and gave "the benefit of any doubt . . . to the plaintiff," the
Court noted that the breadth of the zone of interests will neces-
sarily "var[y] according to the provisions of law at issue."250 Thus,
it would be theoretically possible, if not desirable, to define the
Rehabilitation Act's zone of interests narrowly-perhaps as nar-
rowly as the Eleventh Circuit construed the standing provision in
McCullum.21 A narrow zone-of-interests standard could reflect
that Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act to protect only dis-
abled individuals, so only those who have "suffer[ed] injury be-
cause they were subjected to conduct proscribed by the Act"-that
is, they were personally excluded, denied benefits, or subjected to
discrimination on the basis of their own or an associate's disabil-
ity-would have standing.252
There are, however, persuasive reasons why the Rehabilitation
Act's zone of interests should be construed broadly. One is the for-
mulation of the test itself. In Lexmark, Scalia posed the question
as one of "determin[ing] the meaning of the congressionally en-
acted provision . . . apply[ing] traditional principles of statutory
interpretation."23 Thus, courts should look first to the dictionary
248 See note 261 and accompanying text.
249 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1389.
250 Id.
251 See McCullum, 768 F3d at 1143.
252 Collins, 2015 WL 268842 at *8. An even more extreme zone-of-interests test might
disallow associational suits altogether. This approach, however, would run counter to
congressional intent on the issue, as the ADA expressly provides for associational suits
and the two Acts' substantive provisions are generally to be read together. See Part I.C.
253 Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1388.
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definitions of the statutory language at issue-here, "any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act"254-for guidance. Black's
Law Dictionary defines "aggrieved party" broadly to encompass
"a party whose . . . rights have been affected by another person's
actions."255 Coupled with the expansiveness of the term "any,"
nothing in that definition provides support for a narrow reading.
Applying those principles to the associational discrimination
cases under the Rehabilitation Act surveyed above demonstrates
the impact that a properly broad zone of interests would have on
the associational standing question. While the Loeffler court re-
lied on an overly expansive interpretation of the language in the
statute, the result in that case is consistent with a lenient zone-
of-interests inquiry. McCullum, Collins, and Durand, however,
should have come out differently. The injuries of the plaintiffs in
those cases were not so "marginally related to or inconsistent with
the purposes implicit in the statute" as to bar recovery for their
direct and foreseeable harms256-unlike the claims of the Loeffler
dissent's hypothetical meal-preparing relative, which will be
blocked by proximate cause no matter the width of the zone of
interests.257
C. Deterring Discriminatory Behavior
There is another benefit to adopting a wide zone-of-interests
test when interpreting the Rehabilitation Act: deterrence. As
John Briggs recognized, "an award of compensatory damages in
an action brought by an individual handicapped person against a
discriminatory program enhances the opportunities available to
all handicapped persons."258 This principle holds true more gener-
ally as well: the threat of having to pay damages-regardless of
to whom they are owed-affects the cost-benefit calculations in
which entities engage when deciding whether to comply with the
254 29 USC § 794a(a)(2). See also Part III.A.
255 Black's Law Dictionary 1232 (Thomson Reuters 10th ed 2014).
256 Thompson, 562 US at 178 (citations omitted).
257 This is the same as saying that the meal-preparing relative's injuries are so "mar-
ginally related to or inconsistent with" the statutory purpose as to fall outside the zone of
interests.
258 John D. Briggs, Note, Safeguarding Equality for the Handicapped: Compensatory
Relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1986 Duke L J 197, 203 (emphasis
added).
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law.259 The availability of compensatory relief under antidiscrim-
ination statutes, then, "deters discrimination" by "encourag[ing]
federally funded programs to provide the legislatively mandated"
opportunities and services for disabled people.260 It provides a
mechanism for effectuating congressional purpose 26' when the in-
centives for complying with the statute are too weak on their own
to deter rational noncompliance.262
A number of prominent scholars and disability rights activ-
ists have taken issue with the ADA's injunction-only remedial
scheme in the public accommodations (Title III) context.263 While
compensatory relief is available under Title II of the ADA, it is
not available under Title II.264 Title III's injunctive relief scheme,
moreover, requires a showing that the disabled individual is
likely to return to the hospital and face the same conduct that led
to the injury in the first place.25 This is particularly problematic
in the healthcare context because it leads to systematic under-
deterrence. In emergency rooms, for example, where an individ-
ual is relatively unlikely to return (at least compared to one's
favorite haunts, such as a mall or a movie theater), there is less
incentive for the hospital to provide the statutorily mandated ser-
vices upfront. This is because a plaintiff will nearly always be
unable to show a likelihood of returning and being re-injured by
the discriminatory conduct.266
The incentives to provide the statutorily mandated services
are even weaker under Title III in the context of associational
claims. In the case of a plaintiff who is injured in fact by discrim-
inatory conduct on the basis of her association with a disabled
person, the plaintiff must be prepared to make two separate
showings, both supported by a preponderance of the evidence. She
259 See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 Harv L Rev 869, 873 (1998) ("Our conclusions ... flow from the
basic principle that, to achieve appropriate deterrence, injurers should be made to pay for
the harm their conduct generates.").
260 Briggs, 1986 Duke L J at 203 (cited in note 258).
261 Id at 204.
262 See note 268.
263 See, for example, Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 183 (cited in note 11) (chron-
icling the systematic underenforcement of the ADA and observing that the remedial
scheme of Title III has been ineffective at eliminating barriers).
264 See Rothstein, 75 Ohio St L J at 1302-03 (cited in note 19).
265 See McCullum, 768 F3d at 1145 (denying recovery on the ADA claim because the
plaintiff could not show a substantial likelihood of returning to the hospital and being
reinjured).
266 See id.
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must be able to (a) show a substantial likelihood that the disabled
individual with whom she is associated will again be injured by
the discriminatory conduct complained of-a proposition that, as
discussed above, is surprisingly difficult in its own right; and
(b) she must show a substantial likelihood that she herself will be
re-injured by that discriminatory conduct.267 Consider the meal-
preparing relative from the Loeffler dissent, for whom this task is
likely prohibitive. Not only would she need to show that the
hospital would fail a second time to provide a gluten-free meal,
she would need to show that the task of meal preparation would
again fall to her. And-crucially-she would need to show that in
the process of preparing this meal she is likely to burn herself
again, a possibility so speculative as to be ridiculous.268 By defini-
tion, pleading and proving an associational discrimination claim
under Title III will never be less difficult than pleading and prov-
ing a regular discrimination claim because the associational claim
relies on the regular discrimination claim. Most likely, it will be
a great deal more difficult.
Unlike Title III of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act provides
for compensatory damages.269 Because this gives private plaintiffs
a greater incentive to sue, the Rehabilitation Act is already a bet-
ter candidate than Title III to incentivize compliance with federal
antidiscrimination law. But rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's arti-
ficially narrow reading of associational standing under the
Rehabilitation Act and authorizing a broader class of associa-
tional plaintiffs would go even further toward incentivizing feder-
ally funded programs to invest up front in the opportunities and
services for people with disabilities already required by law.
Simply put, any statute that does not allow for associational
standing is allowing some defendant institutions to refrain from
internalizing negative externalities. Under a model that recognizes
a wide zone of interests for the Rehabilitation Act, a governmental
entity that discriminates against a person with a disability might
267 See id.
268 See Loeffler, 582 F3d at 287 (Jacobs dissenting). To be sure, blocking the meal-
preparing relative's Title III claims certainly seems like the correct result in this case
given the attenuated nature of her injuries. The potential for abuse in the injunction-only
scheme, however, becomes apparent if one considers the incentives that businesses have
to not comply voluntarily with the law. Because businesses are not forced to internalize
all costs under the current system, a business might make the quite rational calculation
that the financial cost of making its building handicapped accessible is likely to outweigh
the potential gain from increased business from customers with disabilities. This is argu-
ably not the sort of cost-benefit efficiency that the law should indulge.
269 See Rothstein, 75 Ohio St L J at 1302 (cited in note 19).
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find itself with two claims against it with respect to the same set
of facts--one from the person with a disability herself and the
other from the nondisabled person that accompanied the person
with a disability. The threat of having to pay more than one set
of damages under the Rehabilitation Act, then, would force the
defendant to internalize those externalities, perhaps deterring in-
juries that the ADA's relative toothlessness27o would not. Put dif-
ferently, increasing the number of plaintiffs and bolstering their
rights under the Rehabilitation Act may help remedy the weak-
nesses inherent in the ADA's remedial scheme.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that neither the Second nor the
Eleventh Circuit was entirely correct in its analysis of the scope
of statutory standing under the Rehabilitation Act. While statu-
tory language conferring standing on "any person aggrieved" has
traditionally been interpreted broadly by the courts, recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that reading the phrase
"any person aggrieved" to be coextensive with Article III's injury
requirement is too generous. At the same time, these cases sug-
gest that the McCullurm court's reading of the phrase was unnec-
essarily restrictive.
A more compelling interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act's
standing provision would avoid both of these extremes and incor-
porate a lenient zone-of-interests test-one that recognizes the
viability of suits brought by associational plaintiffs while simul-
taneously conferring standing only on those plaintiffs who can
demonstrate injuries sufficiently related to the defendant's con-
duct to satisfy proximate cause. Such an interpretation of the
zone-of-interests test is permissible under Justice Scalia's flexible
formulation, which varies according to the provision of law at
issue. This Comment has argued that courts should prefer a lenient
test in the Rehabilitation Act context given the plain language of
the Act, the substantial latitude that Congress has granted the
courts in adjudicating the Act, and the advantages that a lower bar
to entry to federal court would have on deterring discriminatory
behavior.
270 See Bagenstos, Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement at 124-28 (cited
in note 11) (noting the systemic problem of ADA underenforcement and arguing that the
incentives for bringing suit under the ADA are too weak to lead to full enforcement).
1324 [84:1285
